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In his bid for the Presidency, Donald Trump marketed himself as the true voice of the people and 
as the sole leader who could restore America’s greatness. This approach is reminiscent of 
reactionary populist movements, which have been shown historically to attract “authoritarians”, 
that is, the dissatisfied and personally insecure who look to a powerful leader to vicariously 
fulfill their desires. More recent psychological research suggests, however, that another group of 
supporters may also be drawn to such movements. This “dominance-seeking” group is instead 
characterized by strong desires to attain status and power for themselves and their ingroups. In 
two studies conducted in the lead up to 2016 Presidential election, I measured White male, 
American participants’ levels of personal agency and satisfaction with social issues as predictors 
of support for Donald Trump’s campaign. My findings show that high agency and low 
satisfaction predicted the strongest support for Trump, suggesting that his most ardent supporters 
fit the profile of the dominance-seeking group as opposed to the more historically identified 
authoritarian group. These findings highlight the importance of considering multiple perspectives 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
A US Presidential election is always a monumental event. By some measures, the most 
recent 2016 election ran for 597 days (Friedman, 2016). For reference, you could potentially fit 4 
Mexican, 7 Canadian, 14 British and Australian, or 41 French elections within this time frame 
(Roller, 2016). Looking at some other metrics, fundraising and spending tallies by candidates 
were well into the billions of dollars (Narayanswamy, Cameron, & Gold, 2017) and the two final 
candidates traveled more than four hundred thousand miles between them (Rocheleau, 2016). 
While this may seem excessive, it is perhaps for good reason. For all the time logged, money 
spent, and distance traveled, by the end of it all, the winning candidate will hold arguably the 
most powerful position in the world.  
With all that being said, something about this most recent election in particular seemed 
remarkable. This feeling was probably due in no small part to the fact that there was a very non-
traditional candidate who ran for Office. In fact, not only did he run for Office, but he also 
became a serious contender for it, and eventually went on to win it all. This candidate was of 
course Donald Trump. 
President Trump’s election win was perhaps surprising because of the way the candidate 
positioned himself. The billionaire, real estate mogul, and reality TV star seemed to have sold 
himself as the leader of a reactionary populist movement, one that looked to challenge both the 
mainstream and conventional political establishment. Like leaders of most populist movements, 
Trump marketed himself as the true voice of the people in opposition to the phony and corrupt 
elites. At the same time, Trump’s candidacy can be described as a reactionary movement as, like 
other reactionary movements, his assessment of social problems and prescribed solutions were 
for the most part backward-looking. Trump often harkened back to a better time and emphasized 
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the need to “Make America Great Again” by addressing problems that he felt came from foreign 
adversaries and internal scapegoats. 
Examining the motivations that fuel reactionary populist movements has been a long-
standing interest of social psychology. One of the early catalysts for this interest occurred in the 
midst of World War II, as psychologists tried to explain how fascist parties found so much 
success (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Fromm, 1941). Psychological 
accounts of these reactionary populist movements prototypically characterize supporters as 
“authoritarians,” people who are seeking out strong, external authority figures who can offer 
vicarious strength to compensate for their own personal underlying psychological insecurities. 
These insecurities are characterized in varying ways according to different models. Early models 
argued insecurity stemmed from the repressed desires of the masses (Adorno et al., 1950), while 
more recent models emphasize things like a need for social order and structure (Jost & Banaji, 
1994) or a lack of personal control (Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008). What all 
these accounts have in common, however, is the tendency to portray authoritarian followers as 
possessing diminished personal agency and, as such, requiring a strong external control to 
compensate and make up for personal shortcomings (Kay & Eibach, 2013). A recent integrative 
model further suggests that the underlying worldview of authoritarians is one that sees the world 
as a dangerous place that can devolve into chaos and disorder (Altemeyer, 1988; Duckitt, 2001; 
Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). This constant threat leads authoritarians to feel a sense of low personal 
control over their lives, motivating them to lend their support to powerful external structures that 
have the power to contain threats.  
Looking to Donald Trump’s campaign, it is clear to see how he may have appealed to 
authoritarians. One of the primary themes of Trump’s messages was that America was at risk 
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because of the decisions of past regimes and that the people were scared of and angry at this. He 
described how soft immigration policies were responsible for things like crime, terrorism, and 
drugs in America (Beckwith, 2016; The Washington Post, 2015). He also talked about how weak 
negotiation skills and incompetence on the part of the incumbent Democrats had left places like 
the Middle East a powder keg for war (Gambino, 2016). While identifying these threats, 
however, Trump also posed himself as the solution to these problems. Concerning things like the 
visa system and the military, he claimed that nobody knew more about those things than he did 
(Blake, 2016). He campaigned on very tough policies that would control threats such as the 
Mexican border wall to prevent illegal immigration and trafficking (Fox News, 2016), “extreme 
vetting” (Preston, 2016; Vitatli, 2016) and “enhanced interrogation techniques” (Diamond, 2016) 
to weed out and get information on terrorists, and even the potential use of nuclear weapons to 
deal with persistent threats (Legum, 2016). In this way, Trump acknowledged feelings that 
authoritarians might have concerning their fear of the world devolving into chaos. At the same 
time though, he also characterized himself as the strong leader who would protect them from 
danger. In his speech accepting the Republican Party’s nomination, after Trump explained how 
America was facing existential threats that he characterized starkly as “death, destruction, 
terrorism, and weakness,” he subsequently claimed, “I alone can fix it (Collinson & CNN, 
2016).” Given the prominent role that these classic authoritarian themes played in Trump’s 
campaign there is good reason to expect that the standard account of authoritarians, along with 
their worldview and motivations, might provide a good description of Trump supporters.  
A more recent model of political ideology, however, suggests that the standard account of 
authoritarians may not always apply when explaining support for reactionary populist 
movements and, instead, a different motivational foundation may be present (Duckitt, 2001; 
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Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). While this model recognizes that authoritarian motivations rooted in 
low personal agency and a “world is a dangerous place” mindset may explain support for 
reactionary populist movements, it proposes a second profile as well. This second profile of 
supporter is motivated by a desire to obtain personal and group dominance (Pratto, Sidanius, 
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) and carries the worldview that we live in a “competitive jungle” 
(Duckitt, 2001). Unlike authoritarians, who may be characterized as having low personal agency, 
these social dominance seeking reactionaries are instead characterized as having high agency and 
a high drive for personal and group empowerment.  
Again, a look at Trump’s campaign illustrates that he emphasized themes that may have 
strongly engaged these dominance-seekers. Trump often brought up how the world was a 
competitive place with “winners” and “losers”, but that America’s leaders seemed to have 
forgotten this and now the people were fed up. Trump also framed international relations in ways 
that suggested a competitive, zero-sum view. For example, when he referred to deals like the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (Abadi, 2016), NAFTA (Gillespie, 2016), and trade deals with China 
(The Economist, 2016) he lamented how Americans were losing on these deals. He also talked a 
lot about domestic issues such as unemployment and the loss of jobs to immigrants that had left 
true Americans struggling to find work (Preston, 2016). He did not just stop in identifying these 
issues, however, but also posed solutions that only he himself could carry out because of his 
business acumen and singular knowledge (Blake, 2016). “America First” policies, for example, 
that would entail things like the renegotiation or outright scrapping of unfavourable deals (The 
White House, 2017a) or the relaxation of corporate taxes to encourage businesses to stay in 
America and hire Americans (The White House, 2017b). These things, he argued, would put 
America back on the path to its rightful place on top. In his speech accepting the Republican 
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Party’s nomination Trump articulated these dominance concerns quite clearly at one point 
claiming “I will win for you” if the American people chose him to be their leader (Schoeder, 
2016). For these reasons dominance-seeking concerns might provide an alternate explanation for 
the motivations that may have been fueling Trump supporters. 
In sum, Trump’s campaign seems to resemble a reactionary populist movement. While 
the standard profile of supporters of such movements is that of an authoritarian, a person with 
low personal agency who sees the world as a threatening place and thus needs a powerful leader 
to enforce control for them, a plausible second profile of likely supporters also emerges. This 
dominance-seeking group is instead characterized by high agency and a desire to obtain means to 
exercise that agency to propel their own personal and group status. Looking at some of Trump’s 
stances on social issues, it is very clear that he could have appealed to either of these groups. Not 
only did Trump acknowledge both of these groups’ concerns, but he also posed very direct 
solutions to them. This strategy may have gone a long way in getting Trump the support and 
voters he needed to become successful in his bid for the Presidency.  
This Research 
The purpose of this research is to examine Donald Trump’s supporters and determine 
which of the two supporter profiles, that is, low agency authoritarians or high agency dominance- 
seekers, he may have appealed to more. The model of populist movement support that I am 
testing is a reactive approach motivation model (Jonas et al., 2014; McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, 
2009; McGregor, Nash, & Prentice, 2010). Reactive approach motivation models entail two key 
ingredients: a motivational predisposition and a threat that activates that motivation. The 
particular model that I am testing suggests that the motivational predisposition for supporting a 
reactionary populist movement may have entailed either a low-agency, authoritarian motivation 
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or a high-agency, dominance-seeking motivation. The relevant threats for activating these 
motivations would be perceptions of danger and perceptions of competitive threats respectively. 
Therefore, to operationalize the two profiles of potential supporters of Trump’s populist 
campaign, I used two predictor variables. The first is a measure of trait personal agency to 
capture which type of predisposing motive was associated with support for this populist 
movement and the second is a measure of social issues satisfaction to capture perceived threats 
that may activate these motivations.  
Personal Agency 
 If Trump’s campaign appealed more to the authoritarian group, then participants who are 
low in personal agency should show higher levels of support for Trump when they are threatened 
compared to threatened high-agency individuals and unthreatened individuals. This low-agency 
group would likely carry personal insecurities that should be activated when they see the world 
becoming an unstructured or dangerous place. As a result, they may see Trump as a powerful 
source of external control who can address their needs and protect them from looming dangers 
and threats. 
 Alternatively, if Trump’s appeal was mainly concentrated in dominance-seeking 
individuals, I would expect to see that participants who are high in personal agency should be 
predisposed to support Trump when threatened compared to low-agency individuals or 
unthreatened individuals. This high-agency group would likely be looking for opportunities to 
increase their standing in the competitive jungle that they perceive the world to be. This group 
may see Trump as the person to address their concerns about America’s declining 
competitiveness or perceived unearned status gains by outgroups within their own system. 
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 I chose to operationalize the distinct motivational profiles with a general agency measure 
rather than the usual right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981) and social dominance scales 
(Pratto et al., 1994) because I sought to measure the underlying motivations in a way that did not 
contain explicit political content. The standard measures of authoritarianism and social 
dominance orientation contain items that directly reference political values and attitudes. If both 
the predictor variables and the outcome measures in my study contained explicit political content 
then there would be a potential that any associations may be due to shared method variance 
rather than due to the hypothesized motivational processes. Therefore, instead of using the 
standard authoritarianism and social dominance scales I used a measure that I thought would 
capture the underlying differences in personal agency that I hypothesized underlie these distinct 
motivations.    
Social Issues Satisfaction 
 I measured participants’ satisfaction with a variety of relevant social issues as a measure 
of threat that may have catalyzed support for Trump’s campaign. Populist movements arise 
because of growing dissatisfaction with the status quo. Philosophers Kierkegaard and Nietzsche 
called this dissatisfaction ressentiment, or resentment. They argued that when the masses could 
no longer stand the oppression heaped on them by the elite and privileged this caused a boiling 
over of resentments that led to populist revolts (Kierkegaard & Dru, 1962; Nietzsche, 1887). For 
authoritarians, this dissatisfaction would be motivated by fear of danger and disorder. For 
example, they may be dissatisfied with the social issue of illegal immigration because they think 
immigrants will bring crime or possibly dilute the culture of the country if they refuse to 
assimilate (Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008). For dominance-seekers, dissatisfaction would 
be motivated by threats of competition. Taking the example of illegal immigration again, they 
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may oppose it because they are concerned that immigrants will outcompete them for jobs or 
resources (Thomsen et al., 2008).  
To allow evidence for either type of reactionary profile to emerge I sought to measure 
dissatisfaction with social issues in way that would be neutral to whether these dissatisfactions 
were rooted in authoritarian concerns or dominance-related concerns. My intention was to 
capture general feelings of dissatisfaction rather than ask for the specific reasons for these 
feelings. One reason I did this was the general evidence suggesting that people can usually report 
their levels of satisfaction-dissatisfaction with more validity than they can identify the specific 
reasons for that satisfaction-dissatisfaction (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  Thus, rather than building 
authoritarian and dominance motives into the reactive concerns measure, I attempted to measure 
the contribution of these motives solely through the measure of personal agency and used the 
measure of social issues satisfaction to capture threats that might be relevant to either of these 
motives.   
The main goal of my research is to test which of these two groups of potential supporters 
was most motivated to support Trump’s populist movement: low-agency, low-satisfaction 
authoritarian followers or high-agency, low-satisfaction dominance-seekers.  As mentioned 
previously, there are reasons to believe aspects of Trump’s messages contained themes that 
might resonate with authoritarians as well as themes that might resonate with dominance-
seekers.  
Predictions  
1. There will be a main effect of social issues satisfaction such that that those who are relatively less 
satisfied are more likely to support Trump. 
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2. There will be an interaction between social issues satisfaction and personal agency. However, the 
pattern of this interaction may fit either an authoritarian profile or a dominance-seeking profile: 
a. If the pattern fits the authoritarian profile, then those with low agency and low 
satisfaction will support Trump more strongly relative to those who are high-agency and 
low-satisfaction and those who are high-satisfaction, regardless of agency. 
b. If the pattern fits the dominance-seeking profile, then those with high agency and low 
satisfaction will support Trump more strongly relative to those who are low-agency and 




CHAPTER 2: PILOT STUDY 
 I conducted an initial pilot study on Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The primary 
goal of the pilot study was validating my measures to make sure participants understood them, 
with a secondary goal of testing my predictions. Participants answered questions about their 
satisfaction with various social issues and filled out a self-report measure of personal agency. 
Participants also indicated whom they intended to vote for during the election and answered a 
hypothetical question about the lengths they would go to support Donald Trump. A few other 
exploratory measures (e.g., items measuring perceptions of the candidates’ characteristics) were 
included but are not directly relevant to the focus of this paper. 
I predicted I would see a main effect of social issues satisfaction such that lower 
satisfaction predicts support for Trump. Also following my prediction, I expect to see an 
interaction between social issues satisfaction and personal agency, that is, low satisfaction 
predicting differing levels of support for Trump at different levels of personal agency. If the 
interaction with low agency predicts stronger support for Trump, this would suggest that Trump 
may have appealed more to the authoritarian group. If high agency predicts stronger support, this 
would suggest that Trump may have appealed more to the dominance-seeking group. 
Method  
Participants. Data was collected the period of June 10-16, 2016. In total, 101 White 
male, American citizens completed my pilot study. I specifically chose this demographic because 
this was the group that was projected most likely to support Trump (Cohn, 2016; Wasserman, 
2016) and I wanted to maximize the chances of detecting an effect. This sample size was chosen 
because I wanted a quick test of my measures before committing to a larger sample that would 
require greater resources. 
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Procedure and Materials. First, participants answered demographics and screening 
questions. Those who fit my screening criteria were then randomly split by our survey platform, 
Qualtrics, into two equal groups. One group answered the items about social issues satisfaction 
and personal agency (the predictor variables) first, followed by whom they intended to vote for 
and their levels of support for Trump (the dependent measures). The other group saw the items in 
the reverse order, that is, dependent measures first followed by the predictor variables. This 
counterbalancing was an exploratory choice on my part. Following research on threats and 
defensive reactions, I thought if participants were cued with answering about their 
(dis)satisfaction with social issues first, that this might lead them to more extreme answers when 
indicating their support for candidates (Jonas et al., 2014; McGregor et al., 2009). After these 
measures, participants filled out some feedback questions asking if they had any problems with 
the study. No participants expressed any difficulty responding to my measures of interest.1 
Results 
To analyze the results of my pilot study, I ran a Question Order x Social Issues 
Satisfaction x Personal Agency regression model. Predictor variables were centred using 
standardized z-scores. For both voting intentions and the Trump defense measures there were 
trending results for the 3-way interaction, β = .07, t(100) = 1.46, p = .149 and β = .29, t(100) = -
1.98, p = .051 respectively2.  
The pattern of these results appears to support the prediction that authoritarians are 
Trump’s strongest supporters (see Appendix A for a graphical representation). Of those who 
answered the predictor items first, those who were both low in satisfaction and low in agency 
                                                 
1 For more in-depth details about the procedure and measures, see Study 1 which largely uses the same paradigm 
2 Detailed results available upon request 
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were more likely to support Trump. There also appears to be a main effect of social issues 
satisfaction on the voting intentions measure, such that lower satisfaction predicts intentions to 
vote for Trump, and a main effect of personal agency for both dependent measures such that 
lower agency predicts more support for Trump. Given the small sample size (N = 101), however, 
these results should be interpreted with caution. Therefore, in Study 1 I sought to further test my 
hypotheses in a full-scale study with a much larger sample. 
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CHAPTER 3: STUDY 1 
 Study 1 was meant to provide a stronger test of my predictions. This study measured 
participants’ satisfaction with the way their country was handling various social issues and their 
self-reported personal agency. Participants again answered items about which candidate they 
intended to vote for and the lengths they would go to support Trump in a hypothetical scenario. 
Novel items also additionally measured participants’ dedication towards supporting their 
candidate. 
Pre-registration 
 Based on the trending pattern observed in the pilot study, I pre-registered predicted 
results for Study 1 on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/). Specifically, I pre-registered 
the predicted Question Order x Social Issues Satisfaction x Personal Agency interaction, 
hypothesizing that those who see my predictor measures first, are low-satisfaction, and are low-
agency would report the highest levels of support for Trump. This prediction would be in line 
with the hypothesis that the authoritarians rather than the dominance-seekers are Trump’s 
strongest supporters. 
Method 
Participants. Data was collected July 12-19, 2016. Of note, this time period led up to 
and included the first two days of the 2016 Republican National Convention. I recruited 600 
White male, American citizens on MTurk. Participants were compensated $0.50 USD for 
completing my study. Again, I specifically screened for White male, American citizens as this 
group was projected to be most likely to support Trump. The sample size was chosen because I 
wanted to a much larger sample (relative to the pilot study which had trending patterns) to allow 
for more confidence in the results. Analyses excluded 19 participants who did not complete at 
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least half of the survey items in their entirety, indicated that they did not want their data used in 
the final analyses, or expressed anger over the survey items on a feedback question. My final 
sample consisted of 581 participants (Mage = 36.6, SDage = 11.9; MIncome Bracket = $35,001 to 
$50,000; 64% had at least a college degree, see Table 1 for complete demographics).  
Table 1 
 
Demographic Characteristics of Participants (%) by Study 
Variable Study 1  Study 2  
   
Age   
  - 20 or below 2.1 2.5 
  - 21 to 30 33.6 28.6 
  - 31 to 40 34.8 28.2 
  - 41 to 50 15.3 23.9 
  - 51 to 60 8.3 10.9 
  - 61 or above 5.7 5.5 
  - missing or N/A 0.2 0.4 
Education     
  - Below College Degree 36.0 39.5 
  - College Degree 43.2 42.4 
  - Above College Degree 20.8 18.1 
Household Income   
  - $35,000 or below 34.3 24.4 
  - $35,001 to $75,000 36.5 40.3 
  - $75,001 or above 29.3 35.3 
Political Leaning     
  - LiberalA 48.1 11.3 
  - Moderate 19.6 18.5 
  - ConservativeA 30.8 70.2 
  - NoneB 1.4 -- 
Party Affiliation   
  - Democrat 35.3 7.1 
  - Republican 24.6 66.0 
  - Independent 32.7 24.8 
  - Other parties 4.0 1.3 
  - No preference   3.3 0.8 
   
A Indicated at least “Slightly liberal” or “Slightly 
conservative”  
B Indicated “I haven’t thought about it much” 
 
Procedure and Materials. Participants were invited to my study on MTurk. The survey 
was titled Assessing Support for Political Candidates and was described as a study that would 
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examine a participant’s feelings towards certain political candidates via questions about their 
attitudes towards candidates and questions about themselves. The study was also described as 
having eligibility requirements that would be assessed at the beginning of the task.  
 Upon starting the survey, participants filled out demographics and screening questions. 
Prospective participants were asked their race, gender, and citizenship status along with age, 
household income, education level, political orientation and party affiliation. Individuals who 
were White male, American citizens were allowed to continue with the rest of the survey. 
Ineligible individuals were told they did not qualify and were dismissed from the rest of the 
survey. Participants then read an information letter and formally consented to have their data 
collected. They then read and filled out an Instructional Manipulation Check that explained the 
importance of accurate responses and attentive participation. They had to pass this check before 
proceeding with the rest of the survey. 
Like the pilot study, half of the participants answered the predictor variables first, 
followed by the dependent measures. The other half of the participants got the items in the 
reverse order. A few additional exploratory measures3 included in this study were not analyzed 
for the purpose of this paper.  
Predictor Variables. To assess levels of social issues satisfaction I used the same 
measure as in the pilot study. Participants were asked “How satisfied are you with the way our 
political system seems to currently be handling these issues?” followed by a list of 17 social 
issues (e.g., Health Care, Education, Unemployment and Low Wages, Illegal Immigration). 
Participants answered these items on a 1 (Extremely dissatisfied) to 7 (Extremely satisfied) scale. 
                                                 
3 These included measures of participants’ general, financial, and relationship satisfaction; their trait anxiety; 
perceived personal ability to influence government; questions comparing the qualities of Donald Trump vs. Hillary 
Clinton; and questions about how they felt at the end of the study. 
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To compute an overall measure of social issues satisfaction, I averaged the 17 items together (M 
= 3.11, SD = 1.05, α = .91). 
To assess a participant's personal agency, I also used the same measure as I did in the 
pilot study. The measure was created by Mike Prentice who factor analyzed items from a variety 
of scales used in the threat, defense, and motivation literatures (Prentice, in prep.). The analysis 
showed that 15 items loaded together well and it is argued that someone who scores highly on 
these items can be described as “reflecting a general agentic and engaged personality style 
characterized by wanting to move toward incentives, having confidence in navigating pursuits, 
integrating pursuits with ideals, and feeling rewarded when goals are attained” (Prentice, in 
prep.). Sample items include: “In general, I am focused on achieving positive outcomes in my 
life” (Rosenberg, 1965); “Overall, I am more oriented toward achieving success that preventing 
failure” (Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002); “If I see a chance to get something I want, I move 
on it right away” (Carver & White, 1994); and “I can think of many ways to get the things in life 
that are most important to me” (Snyder et al., 1991). Participants answered these items on a 1 
(Very false for me) to 4 (Very true for me) scale. To compute an overall measure of personal 
agency, I averaged the 15 items together (M = 3.28, SD = 0.50, α = .93). 
Dependent Measures. Participants indicated which candidate they intended to vote for in 
the upcoming election. Participants saw the following options: Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, 
other (please specify), and “I would not vote for any of the current candidates”. In total, 33.2% 
of participants indicated intentions to vote for Donald Trump, 34.3% for Clinton, 18.4% for other 
candidates (mostly Gary Johnson of the Libertarian Party, Hillary Clinton’s rival for the 
Democratic Party nomination Bernie Sanders, and Jill Stein of the Green Party), and 14.1% said 
they would not vote for any of the current candidates.    
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New for Study 1 were three measures designed to further capture the strength of support 
a participant had for their candidate. Participants only filled these measures out if they indicated 
they actually intended to vote for a candidate. The first new measure asked questions regarding 
participants’ dedication to voting on the day of the election. Participants were asked three 
questions: “For the general election this November, how likely are you to vote [if you had to take 
time off work/ if you were sick or not feeling well / if there was a severe storm or bad weather]?” 
Participants responded on a 1 (Extremely Unlikely) to 5 (Extremely Likely) scale. In the final 
analysis, these three items were averaged together (M = 3.79, SD = 1.37, α = .94).  
The second new measure asked about the amount of time the participant was willing to 
stay in line to vote for their candidate. For this voting time measure, participants chose an answer 
from a scale with options in 15-minute increments, starting from less than 15 minutes all the way 
up to 4 hours or longer (M = 96 min, SD = 69 min). 
The last new measure asked questions about the level of campaign support a participant 
was willing to undertake. Participants indicated how much they would want to take a picture 
with their candidate, how important it would be to follow their preferred candidate in the media, 
how much they would like to wear their candidate’s logo, and how important it would be for 
them to defend their candidate on Internet comment boards and forums. They answered these 
questions on a 1 (Not very much) to 10 (Very much so) scale. I took the average score on these 
four items for my analyses (M = 5.28, SD = 2.47, α = .84).  
Lastly, participants read about the same hypothetical scenario involving Donald Trump as 
used in the pilot study. The scenario was based on actual events occurring at the time where there 
was speculation about Donald Trump not getting the official nomination as the Republican 
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Presidential candidate despite him attaining the most support in the Republican Primaries (Jaffe, 
2016). The scenario read:  
The Republic National Convention this July will officially nominate a candidate to 
represent them for the presidential election in November. While Donald Trump has 
the majority of delegates needed to automatically secure the nomination, it may not 
be that simple. Because of several controversial comments he has made, there have 
been rumors of delegates changing their minds and pulling their support from him in 
favor of other candidates. It is therefore possible that Donald Trump may not become 
the Republican nominee. 
Suppose this very situation happens and the Republican Party decides not to 
nominate Donald Trump as their presidential candidate. Trump, outraged at this, 
publicly calls the system “rigged and crooked” exclaiming “the people have had their 
vote taken away from them by phony politicians!” He further tells his supporters to 
voice their disapproval and urges them to combine their efforts in demonstrating 
their displeasure. 
Participants answered eight items adapted from Altemeyer’s “Posse” scale (Altemeyer, 2006). 
This defense of Trump measure asks whether participants would endorse various protest actions 
in light of the scenario they just read with each action increasing in extremity over the previous 
one. The list starts with relatively mundane protest actions such as telling family and friends how 
bad the decision was and signing petitions. It gets more serious with the middle items such as 
blocking access to government buildings. Finally, it ends with very extreme actions such as 
sabotaging and actively hindering the rest of the election process and supporting violent riots. 
Participants were asked how likely they would be to do these actions on a 1 (Extremely unlikely 
19 
 
to do this) to 7 (Extremely likely to do this) scale. Their responses on the eight items were 
averaged together to get a final score. For this measure, I decided to only analyze those who 
identified as Republicans (M = 2.98, SD = 1.26, α = .84). I did this because non-Republicans 
were not endorsing these items highly (M = 2.20, SD = 1.34, α = .91). As a very last step, 
participants were asked if there was any reason they felt their data should not be used and read a 
feedback letter explaining the purpose of the study. For descriptives and correlations on all the 
described variables, see tables 2 and 3. 
Table 2 
 
Mean (SD), Skewness, Kurtosis, and Reliability of Measures by Study 
Variable M (SD) Skewness Kurtosis 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
     
Study 1     
  Social Issues Satisfaction 3.11 (1.05)  0.00 -0.43 0.91 
  Personal Agency 3.28 (0.50) -0.86 1.03 0.93 
  Voting Dedication 3.79 (1.37) -0.84 -0.65 0.94 
  Voting Time 7.43 (5.62) 0.73 -0.93 -- 
  Campaign Support 5.28 (2.47) -0.04 -0.85 0.84 
  Defense of Trump 2.98 (1.26) 0.41 -0.08 0.84 
Study 2     
  Social Issues Satisfaction 2.93 (1.05) 0.47 0.09 0.88 
  Personal Agency 3.26 (0.52) -0.27 -0.86 0.93 
  CID towards Whites 4.78 (3.30) -0.43 -0.75 -- 
  CID towards Blacks -4.47 (3.12) 0.56 -0.44 -- 
  Defense of Trump 3.47 (1.52) 0.22 -0.61 0.91 
     
Note: CID = Changes in Discrimination, Study 1’s Defense of Trump analyzed only for 





Bivariate Correlations Among Study Variables (Study 1) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Social Issues Satisfaction --     
2. Personal Agency -.05 --    
3. Voting Dedication -.05 .15** --   
4. Voting Time     -.15** .10* .57** --  
5. Campaign Support .01 .15** .29** .28** -- 
6. Defense of Trump <.01    .05 .10* .06 .38** 





Preliminary analysis of Study 1’s data revealed no significant effects of Questions Order 
on my predictor variables or dependent measures. As such, all subsequent analyses collapse 
across order.  
Voting Intentions. I first analyzed the voting intentions variable using a logistic 
regression. Predictor variables were social issues satisfaction, personal agency, and their 
interaction (see Figure 1 and Table 4). These predictors were centred by generating standardized 
z-scores. The full model was significant over a constant only model, χ2 (df = 3) = 30.87, p < .001. 
Consistent with my predictions, social issues satisfaction made a significant contribution to 
prediction, b = -.38, SE = .09, p < .001. Personal agency did as well, b = .22, SE = .10, p = .026. 
The results also indicated a significant interaction, b = -.23, SE = .10, p = .023. To probe this 
interaction, I first looked at participants who were at -1 SD in social issues satisfaction and found 
that higher levels of personal agency predicted greater odds of voting for Trump, b = .45. SE = 
.14, OR = 1.564, p = .001. Similarly, at +1 SD personal agency, low social issues satisfaction 
predicted higher odds of voting for Trump, b = -.61. SE = .14, OR = .542, p < .001. Lastly, I 
looked at those +1 SD in social issues satisfaction and saw that, at this level, the predictive power 
of personal agency was non-significant, b = -.02, SE = .14, OR = .982, p = .903.  
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Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting Trump Support from Social Issues Satisfaction and Personal 
Agency (Study 1) 
    95% CI for Exp(B) 
Variable B(SE) Wald Exp(B) Lower Upper 
      
Voting Intentions      
  Social Issues Satisfaction -.38(.09) 16.29 .68*** .57 .82 
  Personal Agency .22(.10) 4.98 1.24* 1.03 1.50 
  Interaction -.23(.10) 5.13 .79* .65 .97 
      
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
 
For the remaining dependent measures, I ran a multiple regression model with personal 
agency, social issues satisfaction, and their interaction as predictors. These predictors were 
centred by generating standardized z-scores. For the voting dedication, voting time, and 
campaign support measures I weighted scores positively if the participant indicated they were 
voting for Trump and negatively if they said were voting for another candidate.  This weighting 
was done by multiplying the participants’ scores by +1 if they said they were voting for Trump 
on my voting intentions measure or -1 if they said they were voting for someone other than 
Trump. Thus, each measure captured the intensity of a participant’s preference for Trump versus 
the rival candidates. 
Voting Dedication. First, I looked at participant’s dedication to voting (see Figure 2 and 
Table 5). Analyses excluded 82 participants who said they did not intend to vote for any of the 
current candidates, retaining 499 participants for analysis. The regression model predicted 
significant variance in voting dedication, F(3, 495) = 14.07, p < .001, adjusted R2 = 0.07. 
Consistent with predictions, I saw a main effect of social issues satisfaction, β = -.24, t(495) = -
5.44, p < .001, such that more dissatisfied participants tended to show stronger dedication to 
voting for Trump (over other candidates). There was also a main effect of personal agency, β = 
0.095, t(495) = 2.202, p = .028. A significant interaction was also detected, β = -.11, t(495) = -
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2.54, p = .011. Simple effects tests showed that for those who were at -1 SD in social issues 
satisfaction, they expressed stronger dedication to voting for Trump (over other candidates) if 
they were also at +1 SD in personal agency, β = .21, t(495) = -3.40, p = .001, compared to those 
who were at -1 SD in personal agency. Likewise, for those who were +1 SD in personal agency, 
they expressed significantly stronger dedication to voting for Trump (over other candidates) if 
they were also -1 SD in social issues satisfaction, β = -0.35, t(495) = -5.56, p < .001, compared to 
those at +1 SD in social issues satisfaction. Also notable is that for participants at +1 SD in social 
issues satisfaction, there was no difference in dedication to voting across levels of personal 
agency, β = -.06, t(495) = -0.25, p = .801. 
 
Figure 2. Personal agency and social issues satisfaction predicting voting dedication (Study 1). 
 
Voting Time. The same analysis was done for voting time (see Figure 3 and Table 5). 
The model predicted significant variance in voting time, F(3, 495) = 14.99, p < .001, adjusted R2 
= .08. I observed a main effect of social issues satisfaction, β = -.24, t(495) = -5.64, p < .001, but 
a non-significant main effect of personal agency, β = 0.06, t(495) = 1.35, p = .177. A significant 
interaction was found, β = -.14, t(495) = -3.28, p = .001. Simple effects tests showed that those 
who were at -1 SD in social issues satisfaction, were willing to wait in line longer to vote for 
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6.22, p < .001, relative to those at -1 SD in personal agency. Similarly, those who were at +1 SD 
in personal agency were willing to wait in line longer to vote for Trump if they were also -1 SD 
in social issues satisfaction, β = .20, t(495) = 3.33, p = .001, compared to those who were more 
satisfied at +1 SD. Lastly, for those at +1 SD satisfaction with social issues, there was no 
difference across levels of personal agency, β = -.82, t(495) = -1.36, p = .174. 
 
Figure 3. Personal agency and social issues satisfaction predicting voting time (Study 1) 
 
Campaign Support. For the measure of campaign support, the regression model 
predicted significant variance, F(3, 495) = 13.45, p < .001, adjusted R2 = 0.07 (see Figure 4 and 
Table 5). Consistent with predictions, I observed a main effect of social issues satisfaction, β = -
.21, t(495) = -4.78, p < .001. A main effect of personal agency, β = .12, t(495) = 2.71, p = .007, 
was also detected. A significant interaction was also found, β = -.13, t(495) = -2.93, p = .004. 
Simple effects tests showed that those who were -1 SD social issues satisfaction were more eager 
to support Trump’s campaign (over other candidates) if they were at +1 SD in personal agency, β 
= .25, t(495) = 4.04, p < .001, compared to those at -1 SD in personal agency. For those who 
were relatively high in personal agency at +1 SD, those who were also low in social issues 
satisfaction at -1 SD expressed a greater willingness to support Trump’s campaign (over other 























for those at +1 SD satisfaction with social issues, there was no difference in campaign support 
across levels of personal agency, β = -.06, t(495) = -0.18, p = .859. 
 
Figure 4. Personal agency and social issues satisfaction predicting campaign support (Study 1). 
 
 Defense of Trump. For my last dependent measure, defense of Trump, I ran the same 
regression model (see Figure 5 and Table 5). As mentioned earlier, I restricted analysis to only 
those who identified as Republicans (n = 143). The regression model predicted significant 
variance, F(3, 139) = 3.82, p = .011, adjusted R2 = 0.07. Inconsistent with predictions, there was 
no main effect of social issues satisfaction, β = -.01, t(139) = -0.11, p = .915. There was also no 
main effect of personal agency, β = -.05, t(139) = -0.45, p = .653. However, there was a 
significant interaction, β = -0.28, t(139) = -3.37, p = .001. Simple effects tests showed that for 
those relatively dissatisfied with the country’s social issues at -1 SD, those who were also 
relatively higher in personal agency at +1 SD indicated greater likelihood of supporting Trump, β 
= 0.23, t(139) = 2.24, p = .026, compared to those low in personal agency at -1 SD. Those who 
rated relatively higher in personal agency at +1 SD indicated greater intentions to defend Trump 
in this hypothetical scenario if they were also relatively less satisfied with the country’s social 
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Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Trump Support from Social Issues Satisfaction and Personal 
Agency (Study 2) 
   95% Confidence Intervals 
Variable B(SE) t Lower Upper 
     
Voting Dedication     
  Social Issues Satisfaction -.96(.18) -5.44*** -1.30 -.61 
  Personal Agency .39(.18) 2.20* .04 .74 
  Interaction -.45(.18) -2.54* -.81 -.10 
Voting Time     
  Social Issues Satisfaction -2.33(.41) -5.64*** -3.14 -1.52 
  Personal Agency .56(.41) 1.35 -.25 1.38 
  Interaction -1.38(.41) -3.28** -2.20 -.55 
Campaign Support     
  Social Issues Satisfaction -1.19(.25) -4.78*** -1.68 -.70 
  Personal Agency .68(.25) 2.71** .19 1.17 
  Interaction -.74(.25) -2.93** -1.24 -.24 
Defense of TrumpA     
  Social Issues Satisfaction -.01(.10) -.11 -.20 .18 
  Personal Agency -.05(.11) -.45 -.28 .17 
  Interaction -.37(.11) -3.37** -.58 -.15 
     
A: only Republicans 




























 Across five different dependent measures, I saw a clear pattern of results. When I ran 
logistic and linear regressions on a model with social issues satisfaction, personal agency, and 
their interaction as predictors, I saw that this interaction significantly predicted participants’ odds 
of voting for Trump, their dedication to voting for him on the day of the election, the amount of 
time they were willing to wait in line to vote for him, their support of his campaign, and the 
intention to jump to his defense should he hypothetically be replaced as the Republican 
candidate.  
On four of these five measures, I saw a significant main effect of social issues satisfaction 
such that those who were relatively lower in satisfaction were showing greater support in the 
direction of Trump rather than in the direction of other candidates. This illustrates that Trump 
supporters were generally dissatisfied with the direction of the country, one of the needed 
elements for a reactionary populist movement. 
Moreover, those who were low in social issues satisfaction and high in personal agency 
consistently expressed stronger enthusiasm for Trump. This finding is consistent with the idea 
that Trump’s messages and campaign may have appealed most to those who fit the high agency 
dominance-seeking profile, rather than the low agency authoritarian profile. 
One alternative explanation of the data is perhaps higher agency in itself predicts greater 
support for candidates. Indeed, for three of the dependent measures there was a main effect of 
personal agency. However, as illustrated in the results section, the simple slope at +1 SD social 
issues satisfaction is non-significant for four of the five dependent measures, such that differing 
levels of personal agency did not predict differing levels of Trump support among participants 
who are relatively satisfied with the current system. To say that another way, there was no 
evidence that high-agency, high-satisfaction participants were motivated to support Trump’s 
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rivals as intensely as high-agency, low-satisfaction participants were motivated to support 
Trump. This divergence leads me to believe that something about Trump was able to motivate 
highly agentic voters in a way that other candidates did not.  
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, I was expecting to see a different pattern 
of results. Based on my pilot study, I preregistered the prediction that I would see a Question 
Order x Social Issues Satisfaction x Personal Agency interaction such that those who saw the 
predictors first, were low in social issues satisfaction, and were low in personal agency would be 
Trump’s strongest supporters. This pattern of results would have Trump’s strongest followers fit 
the authoritarian profile. Instead, Study 1’s data showed that question order did not matter and 
that participants who were high in agency and low in satisfaction were Trump’s strongest 
supporters. This pattern better fits the dominance-seeking profile.  
 I can see two potential explanations for the difference between my preregistered 
prediction and the final results. First, the pilot sample was small at 101 participants and the 
results were not statistically significant but, instead, potentially unreliable trends. Thus, my pre-
registered predictions based on inconclusive pilot data were likely premature. Alternatively, it is 
possible that the political context may have simply changed between the times I collected the 
samples. The US Presidential election sees so much coverage and impressions may evolve as the 
campaigns progresses. It may be the case that early on Trump’s campaign was more attractive to 
the authoritarians and it was not until later, as his campaign evolved and interacted with the 
larger election campaign, that he started being more attractive to the dominance-seekers. With 
this in mind, I decided to run another study to see if this new pattern replicated. 
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CHAPTER 4: STUDY 2 
 In Study 2, I sought to replicate the results showing that high-agency, dissatisfied 
participants were Trump’s strongest supporters, suggesting that they fit a dominance-seeking 
profile. Two new measures were explored, a revised version of the defense of Trump measure 
and an exploratory measure looking at changing perceptions of discrimination as a predictor of 
Trump support. I pre-registered the Study 1 pattern, that it would be the low social issues 
satisfaction by high personal agency group that would be Trump’s strongest supporters, on the 
Open Science Framework. 
Method 
Participants. Data was collected during the period of November 1-8, 2016, the week 
leading up to 2016 Presidential Election. On MTurk, I recruited 250 White male, American 
citizens, who indicated they were voting or had already voted for Trump. This last criterion 
differed from the previous two studies, as I specifically wanted to focus only on differences in 
relative levels of support within Trump-leaning voters. This sample size was chosen so that I 
could complete data collection quickly enough before the election completed, yet still have a 
large enough sample to have confidence in my results. In addition, Study 1 showed that about 
one third of the 581 final sample indicated they were voting for Trump and so this sample size 
was also an attempt to keep the samples somewhat comparable in size.  
Participants were compensated $0.60 USD for completing the study. Analyses excluded 
13 participants from analysis who did not complete at least half of the items in their entirety, who 
indicated that they did want their data used for analyses, or who expressed difficulty answering 
the items. The final sample consisted of 237 participants (Mage = 38.0 years, SDage = 11.7; MIncome 
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Bracket = $35,001 - $50,000; 61% had at least a college degree, see Table 1 for complete 
demographics).  
Procedure and Materials. Participants were invited to participate in my study on 
MTurk. The HIT was described the same way as the previous studies. Prospective participants 
first filled out demographics (identical to Study 1) and a screening questionnaire. Those who 
were White male, American citizens, and who indicated they would be or had already voted for 
Trump were allowed to proceed with the rest of the study. Those who did not meet these 
requirements were dismissed from the study. Similar to Study 1, participants read an information 
letter, provided consent to have their data analyzed, then had to pass an instructional 
manipulation check before proceeding with the survey items. A few other measures present in 
this study were not analyzed for the purpose of this paper.4 
Predictor Variables. Identical to Study 1, participants answered a 15-item trait personal 
agency scale (M = 3.26, SD = 0.52, α = .93). A slightly abbreviated form of the social issues 
satisfaction scale (13 items) was also filled out (M = 2.93, SD = 1.04, α = .88). This measure had 
fewer items because I wished to shorten the overall survey. In addition, the items that were 
removed did not seem to be major issues Trump was emphasizing in his campaign (Education; 
Poverty, Hunger and Homelessness; Religious Rights; Environment and Climate Change). 
A new measure was introduced that assessed the perception of changes in discrimination. 
I used a measure created by Norton and Sommers (2011) where participants are asked “Thinking 
about the following time periods, to what extent do you think Whites were (are) the target of 
discrimination?” Participants answered this question on a 1 (Not at all) to 10 (Very much) scale, 
                                                 
4 These included measures of participants’ general, financial, and relationship satisfaction; perceived personal ability 
to influence government; and perceptions of how they thought Trump would benefit America 
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with regards to each successive decade starting with the 1950s up to the present decade. 
Participants then repeated this same measure, this time thinking about discrimination against 
Blacks instead of Whites. 
Dependent Measure. The sole dependent measure in Study 2 was the defense of Trump 
scale, but with a new scenario. The previous scenario used in the Pilot Study and Study 1 had to 
do with Trump being blocked as the Republican candidate during the Republican National 
Convention. Given the time when this current study was run, that is, the week leading up to 
Election Day, this scenario was no longer relevant. Instead, a new scenario was used that once 
again reflected real life circumstances at the time (Kelsey, 2016). The scenario read: 
As you may have heard, Donald Trump and many of his supporters have expressed 
doubt about the integrity of the voting process this election. Concerns include 
widespread voter fraud, electoral tampering, biased coverage by the media, and 
biased election officials. Because of these concerns Trump has said that he isn’t sure 
he will be able to accept the results of the election.  
Suppose Donald Trump loses the presidential election and chooses not to concede 
the victory to Hillary Clinton. Instead, in a nationally televised speech, he cites voter 
fraud, a rigged system, and widespread irregularities as the reasons for the loss. He 
then urges Americans to stand up to the corrupt system and demonstrate their 
displeasure any way they can.  
After reading the scenario, participants reported their willingness to participate in various protest 
actions in defense of Trump. For the most part, the same items were used as in Study 1, with a 
few of them being rephrased to reflect the new scenario (e.g., “I would support protestors who 
try to block Hillary Clinton’s inauguration” replaced “I would actively hinder or sabotage the 
31 
 
rest of the election process”). As a very last step, participants were asked if there was any reason 
they felt their data should not be used and read a feedback letter explaining the purpose of the 
study.   
Results and Discussion 
 I ran a multiple regression model with personal agency, social issues satisfaction, and 
their interaction as predictors for the defense of Trump measure (see Figure 6 and Table 8). 
These predictor variables were centred by generating standardized z-scores. Unlike Study 1 
where I restricted analysis to only self-identified Republicans, all participants were used in this 
analysis as they had all already indicated they were voting for or had already voted for Trump 
and so were likely to strongly consider supporting him with these protest actions. The overall 
model was marginally significant, F(3, 236) = 2.09, p = .103, adjusted R2 = .01. A significant 
interaction was found, β = -.16, t(236) = -2.44, p = .015. Simple effects tests at +1 SD personal 
agency were in line with my predictions. Those who were highly agentic, and were also 
relatively lower in their satisfaction indicated the highest intentions to defend Trump, β = -.19, 
t(236) = -2.07, p = .039. For those who were low in satisfaction at -1 SD, there was a non-
significant difference between those at high and low levels of personal agency, β = .12, t(236) = 
1.39, p = .165, however, the slope was trending in the expected direction. No main effects 
emerged. This result seems to partially replicate the results I saw in Study 1. It appears that there 






Figure 6. Personal agency and social issues satisfaction predicting defense of Trump (Study 2). 
 
I conducted an exploratory analysis with the measures of changes in discrimination (CID) 
predicting defense of Trump. Examining the mean scores of these measures reveals an 
interesting pattern (see Table 6). Recall the sample for Study 2 consisted of White male, 
American Trump voters only. Of this sample, the general trend was to think discrimination 
towards Whites has been on the rise over the decades, with the reverse perception of trends for 
discrimination towards Blacks. Participants on average also thought discrimination towards 
Whites today is greater than discrimination towards Blacks today, and at a level close to 
discrimination towards Blacks in the 1980s.   
Table 6 
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Note: CID = Changes in Discrimination, Mean and (SD) on a 1 (Not at all) to 10 (Very 
much) scale 
To further probe this finding, I calculated two difference scores for each participant by 
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discrimination towards Whites in the 1950s scores and then calculated the comparable difference 
score for perceived discrimination against Blacks. These difference scores thus respectively 
captured perceived change in discrimination towards Whites (CID towards Whites) and towards 
Blacks (CID towards Blacks). A positive difference score would indicate the participant feels 
like discrimination towards the target group is a bigger problem today than it was in 1950s. A 
negative difference score would indicate they feel discrimination towards the target group is less 
of an issue today than it was in the 1950s. The measures of perceived CID towards Whites and 
perceived CID towards Blacks were significantly negatively correlated at -.39, which indicates a 
general tendency to perceive a zero-sum pattern in status for Whites and Blacks (see Table 7). 
Table 7 
 
Bivariate Correlations Among Study Variables (Study 2) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
1. Social Issues Satisfaction --    
2. Personal Agency -.21** --   
3. CID towards Whites -.37** .19** --  
4. CID toward Blacks .28** -.19** -.39** -- 
5. Defense of Trump -.03    -.02 .23** -.05 
Note: CID = Changes in Discrimination 
**p < .01 
 
I next ran a regression model containing the CID towards Whites score, the CID towards 
Blacks score, personal agency, and all the interaction terms. These predictor variables were 
centred by generating standardized z-scores. Overall, the model was significant, F(7, 237) = 
6.36, p < .001, with an R2 = 0.16. Though I did not observe a significant 3-way interaction, p = 
.294, there were significant 2-way interactions. The CID towards Whites x CID towards Blacks 
interaction was significant, p = .001, as was the CID towards Whites x personal agency 
interaction, p = .007. With this in mind, I further explored these two, 2-way interactions. 
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I ran a regression model containing CID towards Whites, CID towards Blacks, and their 
interaction predicting defense of Trump (see Figure 7 and Table 8). Overall, the model was 
significant, F(3, 237) = 11.30, p < .001, adjsuted R2 = .12. There was a main effect of CID 
towards Whites such that participants who thought discrimination towards Whites was becoming 
a worse problem were on average more likely to defend Trump, β = .44, t(237) = 4.29, p < 0.001. 
There was no main effect of CID towards Blacks, β = .10, t(237) = 0.95, p = .344, but there was 
a significant interaction, β = -.41, t(237) = -4.42, p < .001. Simple slopes tests showed that 
among those who felt discrimination towards Whites was becoming worse, higher willingness to 
support Trump was associated with thinking that discrimination towards Blacks was becoming 
less of a problem, β = -.31, t(237) = -2.36, p = .019. Similarly, among those who felt 
discrimination towards Blacks was becoming less of a problem, thinking that discrimination 
towards Whites was becoming worse predicted higher willingness to support Trump, β = .85, 
t(237) = 5.75, p < .001.  
 
Figure 7. Changes in Discrimination (CID) Towards Whites and CID Towards Blacks predicting defense 
of Trump (Study 2). 
I then ran a regression model containing CID towards Whites, personal agency, and their 


























.001, adjusted R2 = .10. There was a main effect of CID towards Whites such that participants 
who thought discrimination towards Whites was getting worse were on average more likely to 
defend Trump, β = .12, t(237) = 4.08, p < .001.  There was no main effect of personal agency, β 
= -.09, t(236) = -0.96, p = .338, but there was a significant interaction, β = .37, t(237) = 4.13, p < 
.001. Tests of simple slopes showed that for those at +1 SD personal agency, if they also felt that 
discrimination towards Whites has been on the rise they were more likely to want to defend 
Trump, β = -.23, t(237) = -5.639, p < .001, compared to if they thought discrimination was now 
less of a problem. At the same time, if a participant felt that discrimination was becoming worse 
toward Whites and they were also high in personal agency, they supported Trump more as well, 
β = .27, t(237) = 2.09, p = .038, compared to those who were low in personal agency. 
 
Figure 8. Changes in Discrimination (CID) Towards Whites and personal agency predicting defense of 
Trump (Study 2). 
These two patterns of results fit well with the idea that part of Trump’s appeal is related 
to dominance-seeking motivations. Recall that one of the primary motivations of this group is to 
be on top and demonstrate superiority. Also, keep in mind that the sample for Study 2 comprised 
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Trump voters, it is those who feel like their group has been getting the raw deal as of late that are 
jumping up to defend Trump the most. If they see discrimination getting worse for their group 
and becoming less of a problem for Blacks, they are more likely to endorse protest actions for 
Trump. Similarly, if they see discrimination towards their group as getting worse and they are 
highly agentic, they are also highly eager to defend Trump. This last finding is perhaps a little 
more meaningful, especially since Blacks were not necessarily the outgroup that was most salient 
for these participants, given that concerns about Mexican immigration were much more strongly 
emphasized in the campaign. These results support my hypothesis that dominance-seekers would 




Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Trump Support from Social Issues Satisfaction and Personal 
Agency (Study 2) 
   95% Confidence Intervals 
Variable B(SE) t Lower Upper 
     
Defense of Trump     
  Social Issues Satisfaction -.05 (.10) -0.46 -.24 .15 
  Personal Agency -.06 (.10) -.60 -.26 .14 
  Interaction -.25 (.10) -2.44* -.45 -.05 
Defense of Trump     
  CID towards Whites .44 (.10) 4.28*** .24 .64 
  CID towards Blacks .10 (.10) .95 -.10 .29 
  Interaction -.41 (.09) -4.42*** -.59 -.23 
Defense of Trump     
  CID toward Whites .39 (.09) 4.08*** .20 .57 
  Personal Agency -.09 (.09) -.96 -.28 .10 
  Interaction .36 (.09) 4.13*** .19 .54 
     
CID = Changes in Discrimination 





CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 In two studies, a clear pattern of results emerged that sheds light on how Trump’s 
campaign may have garnered such enthusiastic support. Following theories on the motivations of 
supporters of reactionary populist movements, Trump’s campaign and messages seems to have 
resonated the most with dominance-seekers. This group is characterized by having a 
preoccupation with power, and the need to gain and maintain status in a world they view as a 
competitive jungle. I operationalized this dominance-seeking profile as one that would have high 
personal agency and low social issues satisfaction.  
In Study 1, we saw a consistent main effect of social issues satisfaction across four 
measures such that those who were relatively more dissatisfied were more likely to support 
Trump over other candidates. This finding is in line with the argument that reactionary populist 
movements arise because of rising frustrations with the status quo imposed by those currently in 
power. This main effect, however, was further qualified by a significant interaction. Simple 
effects tests showed that it was that profile of dominance-seekers, that is, those who were high in 
personal agency and low in social issues satisfaction, who were more likely to vote for Trump 
over other candidates; were more dedicated to voting for him should barriers arise on Election 
Day; were more willing to wait in line to vote for him, were more likely to want to support and 
follow his campaign; and were more willing to engage in protest actions in his name. This last 
measure was further replicated in Study 2.  
In addition, exploratory measures in Study 2 that looked at participants’ perceptions of 
the changing state of discrimination showed that those who felt things were getting worse for 
their ingroup but better for an outgroup were supporting Trump more. Similarly, thinking that 
things were getting worse for your ingroup in tandem with high personal agency also predicted 
higher Trump support. These two exploratory findings lend evidence to the association between 
38 
 
perceived falling status and support of Donald Trump. Loss of status is a very potent motivator 
for dominance-seekers and so these findings are more evidence that Trump may appealed 
particularly to this group.   
These results overall are perhaps a bit surprising, especially given the long history of 
thinking that reactionary populist movements tend to mobilize those who have personal 
psychological insecurities and motivational deficiencies. Perhaps the most influential proponent 
of this perspective was the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche whose thesis on ressentiment argued 
that populist revolts arise when the normally meek masses can no longer stand the oppression 
heaped on them by the elites (Nietzsche, 1887). This thinking was echoed in research on fascism 
and authoritarians (Adorno et al., 1950; Fromm, 1941) and more recently with research on 
system justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994) and compensatory control (Kay et al., 2008). What 
these theories all have in common is the connection between personal insecurities and the 
tendency to attach oneself to powerful entities who can vicariously compensate for them (Kay & 
Eibach, 2013). 
This long tradition of scholarship led me to initially hypothesize that Donald Trump’s 
most recent reactionary populist campaign would most appeal to the same profile of supporters, 
which I operationalized as low personal agency and low social issues satisfaction. In contrast to 
this, I found that Trump’s strongest supporters were high personal agency and low social issues 
satisfaction. This follows relatively more modern theories on populist movements which argues 
that a second profile of supporter exists, one that is primarily concerned about attaining and 
maintaining personal and group power (Duckitt, 2001; Pratto et al., 1994). These results 
highlight the possibility that reactionary populist movements have the potential to be 
misunderstood or mischaracterized if we rely purely on the historical and prototypical profile of 
39 
 
the authoritarian to understand the motivations behind the movement. To obtain a more complete 
understanding we should also strongly consider taking into account the possible contribution that 
dominance-seeking motives might make to fueling support for populist movements like Trump’s.   
Limitations 
 One limitation of this research was with the sample I studied. My sample includes only 
White male, American citizens from MTurk and this demographic is not a representative of 
American voters as a whole. Therefore, my results should be interpreted with caution and one 
should take care when trying to generalize from them to describe the broader population of the 
U.S. In a more representative sample of voters, I may have seen individuals fitting the more 
traditional authoritarian profile of low agency and low satisfaction emerging as Trump’s most 
committed supporters and so my results by no means rule out the possibility that Trump may 
have engaged the support of authoritarians. Still, I think my results are noteworthy in suggesting 
that his campaign, and perhaps other reactionary movements, might have the potential to also 
energize the support of high-agency, low-satisfaction individuals who better fit a dominance-
seeking profile.   
 Another limitation of this research concerns my choices in operationalizing the 
motivations relevant to authoritarianism and dominance-seeking. To the best of my knowledge, 
the way I profiled these groups is unique and therefore require further validation. It would be a 
good idea to see how my measures stack up against more direct and established measures of 
authoritarianism and dominance-seeking. For example, the right wing authoritarianism (RWA) 
(Altemeyer, 1981) and social dominance orientation (SDO) scales (Pratto et al., 1994) are well 
established measures of conservative attitudes. That being said, in my work I intentionally did 
not include these scales as I wanted to get a measure of motivation and ideology that was a little 
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farther removed from carrying overt political content. I did this to remove the odds of impression 
management or social desirability, which have been argued in past research on political ideology 
can be problems when measures use longer propositional statements like the RWA and SDO 
scales use (Rokeach, 1956; Wilson & Patterson, 1968). That is why my current measure of social 
issues satisfaction simply asks to what degree participants are satisfied with social issues and 
does not ask for reasons why they feel that way. That being said, to gain more confidence in my 
findings I could always do a follow up study with my same predictors, but also include the RWA 
and SDO scales. If the same patterns hold, I would expect to see positive associations between 
the low-agency, low-satisfaction group with RWA scores, and the high-agency, low-satisfaction 
group with SDO scores.  
 Alternatively, I could ask participants why they are dissatisfied with certain social issues. 
The same social issue can elicit dissatisfaction for different reasons. For example, a person may 
be dissatisfied with immigrants because they are afraid it will lead to a dilution of the host 
culture (authoritarian concern), or they can be afraid it will lead to more competition for 
resources (dominance-seeking concern). My study did not make this distinction, but instead 
categorized participants as relatively more authoritarian or more dominance-seeking based on 
their personal agency score. If I ask the reasons for dissatisfaction they could be content coded to 
see if they fit either profile. An authoritarian’s dissatisfaction would be concerned with danger or 
the threat of disorder. A dominance-seeker’s dissatisfaction would be more concerned with 
increased competition making it hard for them to gain power and status. One concern with this 
approach, however, is with the accuracy of participants in reporting why they are dissatisfied 
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). In the pilot study, I additionally asked participants for reasons why 
they would or would not vote for Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. For several participants, 
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they simply listed responses that echoed media soundbites and talking points. This makes me call 
into question whether they strongly and personally endorse the reasons they listed, or if they are 
just trying to list as many reasons as possible. I would have to carefully construct my questions 
to avoid this potential problem. 
 One question that arose in meetings with colleagues was whether my measure of social 
issues satisfaction was simply a proxy for liberal or conservative political leanings. Indeed, this 
makes sense as the incumbent party during the election was the Democratic Party and Trump 
belonged to the Republicans. It is possible then that high satisfaction is just a reflection of being 
more liberal and low satisfaction of being more conservative. To address this concern, I returned 
to Study 1’s data and took the social issues satisfaction scores and residualized it on the 
participants’ self-ratings of liberal vs. conservative affiliation (-3 Very liberal to +3 Very 
conservative). On all five of the dependent measures (voting intentions, voting dedication, voting 
time, campaign support, and defense of Trump), the interaction pattern and relevant simple 
effects did not change or lose significance. This indicates to me that my social issues satisfaction 
variable is capturing something beyond just partisan attitudes and, in conjunction with personal 
agency, can uniquely predict support for Donald Trump. 
Conclusion 
 The results from the present Master’s thesis suggest that voters driven by dominance-
seeking motivations may have been particularly attracted to Donald Trump. This group is 
typically motivated by a desire to obtain power for themselves and their group, and they become 
concerned when barriers block this. Some of Trump’s major campaign themes emphasized how 
America had been losing status to other countries and empowering undeserving groups within 
America. Trump also claimed that he alone could reverse these worrisome trends. These themes 
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may have resonated with dominance-seeking voters and effectively mobilized their motivation to 
back Trump’s campaign. This finding is a little surprising in that other similar movements have 
been historically understood to attract a different profile of followers, that is, authoritarians who 
are motivated to seek powerful leaders who can compensate for their own personal insecurities. 
This research thus makes the argument that we should not make assumptions based on historical 
precedent when trying to assess motivations behind political movements, but rather we should 





Abadi, M. (2016, September 24). Where Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump stand on Obama's 
legacy trade deal. Business Insider. Retrieved from http://www.businessinsider.com 
Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). The 
authoritarian personality. New York: Harper. 
Altemeyer, B. (1981). Right-wing authoritarianism. Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada: University of 
Manitoba Press. 
Altemeyer, B. (1988). Enemies of freedom: Understanding right-wing authoritarianism. San 
Francisco, CA, US: Jossey-Bass. 
Altemeyer, B. (2006). The authoritarians. Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. 
Beckwith, R. T. (2016, June 13). Read Donald Trump's speech on the Orlando shooting. Time 
Magazine. Retrieved from http://time.com 
Blake, A. (2016, October 4). 19 things Donald Trump knows better than anyone else, according 
to Donald Trump. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com  
Carver, C. S., & White, T. L. (1994). Behavioral inhibition, behavioral activation, and affective 
responses to impending reward and punishment: The BIS/BAS scales. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 67(2), 319-333. Doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.2.319 
Cohn, N. (2016, June 9). There are more White voters than people think. that’s good news for 
Trump. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com  
44 
 
Collinson, S., & CNN. (2016, July 22). Donald Trump accepts presidential nomination. CNN. 
Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com 
Diamond, J. (2016, March 6). Trump on torture: 'We have to beat the savages'. CNN. Retrieved 
from http://www.cnn.com 
Duckitt, J. (2001). A dual-process cognitive-motivational theory of ideology and prejudice. 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 41-113. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-
2601(01)80004-6 
Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2009). A dual process motivational model of ideological attitudes 
and system justification. In J. T. Jost, A. C. Kay & H. Thorisdottir (Eds.), Social and 
Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification, (pp. 292-313) Oxford University 
Press: New York. 
Fox News. (2016, September 1). Trump doubles down on 'impenetrable, physical' wall during 
immigration speech. Fox News. Retrieved from http://www.foxnews.com 
Friedman, U. (2016, October 5). American elections: How long is too long? The Atlantic. 
Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com 
Fromm, E. (1941). Escape from freedom. New York: Rinehart & Company. 
Gambino, L. (2016, October 25). Donald Trump: Hillary Clinton's policy for Syria would 'lead to 
world war three'. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/international 
45 
 
Gillespie, P. (2016, September 27). Trump hammers America's 'worst trade deal'. CNN. 
Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com 
Jaffe, A. (2016, June 17). Campaign to dump Trump at Republican convention emerges. NBC 
News. Retrieved from https://www.nbc.com 
Jonas, E., McGregor, I., Klackl, J., Agroskin, D., Fritsche, I., Holbrook, C., & Quirin, M. (2014). 
Threat and defense: From anxiety to approach. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (pp. 
219-286) 
Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the 
production of false consciousness. British Journal of Social Psychology, 33(1), 1-27. Doi: 
10.1111/j.2044-8309.1994.tb01008.x 
Kay, A. C., & Eibach, R. P. (2013). Compensatory control and its implications for ideological 
extremism. Journal of Social Issues, 69(3), 564-585. Doi: 10.1111/josi.12029 
Kay, A. C., Gaucher, D., Napier, J. L., Callan, M. J., & Laurin, K. (2008). God and the 
government: Testing a compensatory control mechanism for the support of external systems. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(1), 18-35. Doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.95.1.18 
Kierkegaard, S., & Dru, A. (1962). The present age (p. 43). New York: Harper & Row. 
Legum, J. (2016, August 4). 9 terrifying things Donald trump has publicly said about nuclear 
weapons. Think Progress. Retrieved from https://thinkprogress.org 
46 
 
Lockwood, P., Jordan, C., & Kunda, Z. (2002). Motivation by positive or negative role models: 
Regulatory focus determines who will best inspire us. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 53, 854-864. Doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.83.4.854 
McGregor, I., Nash, K. A., & Prentice, M. (2010). Reactive approach motivation (RAM) for 
religion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99(1), 148-161. Doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0019702 
McGregor, I., Prentice, M. S., & Nash, K. A. (2009). Personal uncertainty management by 
reactive approach motivation. Psychological Inquiry, 20(4), 225-229. Doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10478400903333460 
Narayanswamy, A., Cameron, D., & Gold, M. (2017, February 1). Election 2016: Money raised 
as of Dec. 31. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com 
Nietzsche, F. W. (1887). The genealogy of morals. 
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). The halo effect: Evidence for unconscious alteration of 
judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35(4), 250-256. Doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.35.4.250 
Norton, M. I., & Sommers, S. R. (2011). Whites see racism as a zero-sum game that they are 




Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A 
personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 67(4), 741-763.  Doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.4.741 
Prentice, M. (in prep.). Approach motivated personality scale. 
Preston, J. (2016, September 21). Immigrants aren’t taking Americans’ jobs, new study finds. 
The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com 
Rocheleau, M. (2016, October 12). Which candidate is winning the presidential road race? 
Boston Globe. Retrieved from https://www.bostonglobe.com 
Rokeach, M. (1956). Political and religious dogmatism: An alternative to the authoritarian 
personality. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 70(18), 1-43. Doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0093727 
Roller, E. (2016, September 6). Why this election feels never-ending. The New York Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com 
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Schoeder, R. (2016, July 21). ‘I will win for you,’ Donald trump to say in speech. MarketWatch. 
Retrieved from http://www.marketwatch.com/ 
Snyder, C. R., Harris, C., Anderson, J. R., Holleran, S. A., Irving, L. M., Sigmon, S. T., . . . 
Harney, P. (1991). The will and the ways: Development and validation of an individual-
48 
 
differences measure of hope. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60(4), 570-585. Doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.60.4.570 
The Economist. (2016, November 15). A Trump trade agenda. The Economist. Retrieved from 
https://www.economist.com 
The Washington Post. (2015, June 16, 2015). Full text: Donald trump announces a presidential 
bid. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com 
The White House. (2017a). America first foreign policy. Retrieved from 
https://www.whitehouse.gov 
The White House. (2017b). Bringing back jobs and growth. Retrieved from 
https://www.whitehouse.gov 
Thomsen, L., Green, E. G. T., & Sidanius, J. (2008). We will hunt them down: How social 
dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism fuel ethnic persecution of immigrants in 
fundamentally different ways. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(6), 1455-1464. 
Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2008.06.011 
Vitatli, A. (2016, July 18). Donald Trump shifts on Muslim ban, calls for ‘Extreme vetting’. 
NBC News. Retrieved from https://www.nbc.com 
Wasserman, D. (2016, June 2). ‘Missing’ white voters might help trump, but less so where he 
needs it. Five Thirty Eight. Retrieved from http://fivethirtyeight.com 
Wilson, G. D., & Patterson, J. R. (1968). A new measure of conservatism. British Journal of 
Clinical Psychology, 7(4), 264-269. Doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8260.1968.tb00568.x
49 
 
Appendix A – Pilot Study Results 
 
 




Figure 10. Personal agency and social issues satisfaction predicting defense of Trump (Pilot Study). 
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